Between Displaying and Representing: a Matter of Selection
The ideas I intend to put forward in this paper are intuitively known and practiced by each and every one of us, even without a title of a curator. After all, we all decorate our houses by hanging paintings, posters, photographs, by placing statues and all sorts of furniture – chairs, tables, cabinets, cupboards, as well as lamps, stereo sets, telephones, computers, etc. to make our private intimate surroundings agreeable, pleasant and cozy.
Unknowingly, we all act as curators facing by each and every choice we make a dilemma of selection - should we use all or most of our collection of paintings, posters, furniture we own and display them in our private homes, or should we choose and pick those we consider important, representing taste, autobiography, political inclinations, etc., and put emphasis on those articles we find significant. In short, should we display whatever is available, or exhibit those pieces which represent an idea, an inclination, an ideology.
The question I want to raise, is not so much on the praxis itself – displaying or representing, which to my mind are both legitimate and customarily practiced by prominent professional curators. The question I intend to explicate has to do with the logic behind the two: what does each one of them entail, what are their epistemological and ontological implications vis-à-vis the objects exhibited, and which of the two is suitable for exhibiting art, archeology, natural history objects, toys, fashion, etc.
But before elaborating, let me make a personal note. I consider myself as a freak-museum who obsessively visit again and again museums of all sorts: history museums, archeology museums, toy museums, horror museums, fashion museums, natural history museums, and art museums. I never discriminate or prefer one on the other, and I find them all interesting, appealing and educating. Yet I noticed in the course of years that museums not only differ in their exhibiting material, but also by their practice of presentation – the one I label display the other representation.
My purpose, therefore, is to weigh and evaluate these two options of exhibiting objects and shed light on their nature. To do so I will incorporate two different and opposing points of view: the one advocated by Quine in his well known paper 'natural kinds', and the other is Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance'.
A display
A display is defined by the Oxford dictionary as a "description; something intended for people to look at; an exhibition; a show; a manifestation; a visual presentation of data". In light of this straightforward definition it would not be incorrect to say that a display is a method, or may I say – a medium, with the help of which a collection of available data is exhibited for people to look at. To make my point clear, let me for a moment, take the Oxford's definition for the word 'representation' and compare it with 'display'. A 'representation' according to the dictionary has an added value, i.e.: it is defined as a presentation of a collection of data with the intention to "convey a particular point of view and to influence opinion or action".
Would it be correct to say that a 'display-action' has to do with forms of exhibition typically exemplified by archeology museums, natural history museums, fashion museums, etc., whereas a 'representation-action' is an open texture action, and as such it is typically exemplified by art museum?
To answer these questions, let me start by analyzing the first of the two, and look upon the logic behind a display exhibition, and at its implications on the status of the curator.
The notion of grouping objects under a specific well defined category goes back to antiquity. It was Plato, and then Aristotle, in spite of the differences between the two, who have agreed that one can not see, talk, nonetheless think without a pre-conceptual framework of forms (Plato) or categories (Aristotle). In his well known Cave Allegory (the republic book vii 514a-520a), Plato tries to convince us that the source of knowledge depends on being exposed to what he later labels as the agathon, the form of Good, which stipulates Truth and Existence. The sun (which symbolizes the Good in the allegory) – is the source of knowledge, without which one can not proceed knowing and understanding. Those confined in the Cave, exposed to shadows of light are ipso facto limited in the scope of their knowledge, and as such are unable to see and absorb genuine data. If we translate Plato's idea to modern language we would say that in order to have knowledge (nous) and truly (aletheia) select relevant data, one needs to have the ability to denote the real by his or her conceptual abstract ideas. Without an agathon (the Good), and its derivative forms, we would not be able to sort and cluster objects, phenomena, and events.
Aristotle took a step further by classifying all aspects of reality under ten categories (Categories chap. 5) such as substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, state, action, passion. One can not use language without referring to these categories, nonetheless, one can not apprehend reality and be able to see, recognize and define data, without them. A precondition for forming the notion of colour, of a plant, of an animal, etc., is to have the ability to use these categories. A horse is identified as an animal not by language itself; a horse is identified as an animal because it materializes a suitable category of horseness. To identify a horse as a furniture, or as an art object (as does Maurizio Cattelan) would be considered by Aristotle as a categorical mistake, and yet if we look at it from a wider angle, we could say that breaking a category, as done by Demian Hurst and Cattelan, is an expansion of a category without violating its boundaries.
The legacy of Aristotle is still relevant today. Indeed, our craving to give meaning to reality, compels us to cluster objects, phenomena, events, under specific and determined categories. Only those objects, phenomena, etc., which conform to this principle of categorization, labeled by Quine – natural kinds, are allowed to be clustered under a group. An object is considered a table if and only if it materializes the category of tables, i.e.: it resembles those objects found suitable within the category of tables.
The question now is how a category, i.e.: a natural kind is determined. Quine though reluctant to admit the power of induction, bases his idea of natural kinds on the assumption that if a, b, c, are of the same manifested feature (black), they are all ipso facto a group.[1] That is to say – in order to be able to identify a group of objects and understand their featured characteristics, let us say – archeological relics, toys, fossils, etc., their grouping under one roof should conform to the logic of natural kinds, i.e.: inductively resemble each other. It would not be a far fetched conclusion to say that induction entails a display form of presentation, and one can not display objects, point at phenomena in nature, or at historical events, without assuming their similarity of each natural kind respectively. For example: a display of fossils in a natural history museum is based on the assumption that the next table of the exhibition will show something similar, close to the family of fossils, minerals, etc. but not a collection of fountain pens. Sorting for Quine ( as well as for his predecessors – Plato and Aristotle) is a key word for knowledge, and the fact that sorting is based on similar natural kinds, puts the act of selection carried out by curators, in a very tight position. That is why exhibitions of anatomy, history, natural history, toys, archeology, ethnic and fashion, are all considered a display, based on induction and natural kinds. Choosing objects in a display framework, is a non-open game, i.e.: the rules of induction and natural kinds should strictly be carried out dictating the curator's picking and the choosing. That is why an object in a display framework manifests features presented by its very existence; omitting an object in a display is a lacuna of features which can not be reconstructed by another object. Take for instance an exhibition in a natural history museum: a stuffed bird of a certain species can not be replaced by another stuffed bird of a different species. Either that very bird is shown in the exhibition, or it does not. The same goes with archeological objects, articles of fashion, etc. – each one of the exhibits has its own merit, un-replaceable by another one.
That is why a selection of objects rendered in a display presentation denotes the content of the exhibition. Natural history, fashion, toys, can not be exhibited without a straightforward reference of objects specified for that purpose, which allows for original as well as surrogate objects to be displayed. To display a heart in an exhibition of anatomy, one does not need to display a real heart; a simulated heart either by a poster or a plastic model will do. That is the reason why a display allows for artifacts, surrogates, and pictorial representations by posters or photographs, as a means of an exhibition, whereas under the framework of a representation rendering of exhibits, artifacts and surrogates would not be allowed for replacing real and original exhibits. To represent an idea like freedom, and replace the Guernica with a poster or a model, would no doubt abuse the very idea of the exhibition, nonetheless the merit of the curator.
With this in mind we can conclude that a display exhibition is an archive of knowledge and the power and status vested upon the curator are retrieved by and from the items found in the collection of the museum.
Representation
As mentioned earlier, representation is defined by the Oxford dictionary as a "presentation of data with the intention to convey a particular point of view and to influence opinion or action". If we adhere to the Oxford definition, i.e.: that representation is a collection of data with the purpose to convey a particular point of view, then picking and choosing data are subordinated to the interests, motivations and experiences of the curator. Only those items that are found by the curator contributing to the cohesion of the collection and manifest a shared interest with the group at large, are allowed to be exhibited. To admit an item to an exhibition simply means that the very item manifests a shared trait with the collection already agreed upon, or with the idea behind the exhibition, which is determined by a network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing, better known as family resemblance advocated by Wittgenstein[2].
Family resemblance entails that though there are no features of similarity in a group of objects, they may nevertheless be considered a group due to their multitude relationships and shared interests vis-à-vis each other. Take for instance an adopted child who by no means does not resemble the bulk majority of the family he is in, and yet he is considered an equal member of the family on the basis of his shared goals, motivations, interests with the group he is in. An adopted child may under certain circumstances represent his foster family not on the basis of genetics or phenomenological resemblance, and yet he may legitimately forward the family's values, motivations, shared goals, business, due to his subjective identification with the group he is in. It seems to me correct to say that one can not manifest a shared interest of a group and represent its multitude relationships, without being carefully and meticulously picked and chosen. That is why an art object may cohesively function in a certain exhibition on the basis of its multitude relationships representing an ideology, aesthetic values, political messages, etc., and the very same item would in another context become a member in a totally different exhibition, representing opposing values.
Choosing objects in a representation-action framework is, therefore, an open texture activity, exercised by the power, interest, belief, values of the curator. Another curator, a different context of values, would no doubt change the picture and constitute ad hoc new, unfamiliar and even bizarre rules of representation.
Though by a representation of values we deepen our experience, broaden our sensitivity, and become aware of the environment we live in, the fact that the same item may acquire under a different selection a totally new and unexpected interpretation, bring to the open epistemological questions as to the effectiveness of an exhibition. Would we not prefer long term exhibitions as in the case of a display of anatomy, archeology, and the like, instead of representation exhibitions based on undercurrent motivations? Do we go to see exhibitions just for the sake of exposing ourselves to new, intricate interpretations? Or our motivation to learn, broaden our knowledge are incentives to visit museums?
I am not sure I could answer these questions in this short note, and yet I feel, as an obsessive visitor to museums, galleries, alternative shows, etc. that the space hosting the exhibit, and the curator as an agent of culture, implicitly obey to my two major concepts: representation and display.
Notes
[1]Quine, W. V., 1977, "Natural Kinds", in Schwartz S. P., (ed.) Naming, Nescessity, and Natual kinds, Cornell U. Press. Pp. 155-175
[2]Wittgenstein, L., 1963, Philosophical investigations, paragraphs 65, 66, 67. Oxford u. press
Dr. Ben Baruch Blich has taught in the departments of Philosophy and Cinema Studies at Tel Aviv University since 1988 as well as at other universities and academic schools. Blich's interests and publications are in the fields visual representation, culture and information, as well as in art, photography, media studies, and cinema.
In 1989 he was a visiting scholar to the Warburg Institute in London University and worked together with Roger Scruton and Sir E. Gombrich. In 2002 he was a guest Professor to the Hisk (Higher Institute of for fine Arts) in Antwerp.
At present Blich is a senior lecturer in the Bezalel Academy of Art and Design. In the last five years he has lectured in the Van Leer Institute (Jerusalem), in the School of Architecture (Haifa), at the Hebrew University School of Communication (Jerusalem), and has presented papers at various conferences in Nottingham, Prague, Berlin, Kirchberg, London, New York, Vevey, Antwerp, Maastricht, Dublin etc. Currently invited to lecture in Urbino, Vienna, Avignon, Budapest.
He is the chief editor of 'History and Theory: protocols', issued by the Bezalel academy of art and design.
